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Children’s understanding of inherited resemblance:
The case of two parents
Mark Meerum Terwogt and Hedy Stegge
Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Carolien Rieffe
University of London, UK
Four-, 6-, and 10-year-old children were tested in a forced-choice procedure about their beliefs on
the inheritance of physical characteristics. They were presented with pictures of two biological
parents, and then asked to select the most likely descendant out of three alternatives: a father look-
alike, a mother look-alike, and an alternative representing the combined influence of both parents. In
several question pairs, additional information was given about the parent–child relationship that was
clearly irrelevant to the principles of heredity to examine the extent to which domain confusions were
likely to occur. The majority of the 10-year-olds consistently preferred the alternative in which the
combined influence of both parents was shown and domain confusions hardly ever occurred. Four-
and 6-year-olds, in contrast, were still influenced by information from alien domains, although even
their reasoning about inheritance seemed to be theory-like. Overall, the results suggest that with age,
children develop a more restricted and better-defined conception of the principles of heredity, in
which the combined influence of both parents is acknowledged.
There is ample evidence that even pre-school children believe
that babies (including animal babies) resemble their parents
(e.g., Carey, 1985; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Hirschfeld,
1995; Johnson & Solomon, 1997; Springer, 1992; Springer &
Keil, 1989). Cats have kittens (rather than puppies) and black
people are expected to have black children. Of course, closer
inspection of parents and their offspring reveals that there are
not only similarities, but also differences. However, the child’s
general ideas of resemblance do not seem to be severely
hampered by this phenomenon. The cute, harmless cub with
its big round head looks quite different from the adult tiger, but
is nonetheless expected to become just like his fierce and
dangerous father later on, even by 4-year-olds (Taylor &
Gelman, 1991).
When asked where children’s ideas of family resemblance
come from, we may be tempted to refer to the role of direct
observation. However, family resemblance has proved to be
something that is hard to observe on the basis of physical
appearance only. True, parents with blue eyes tend to have
children with blue eyes. But, it is equally true that this rule is
often violated. In fact, the numerous discrepancies make it very
hard to link parent and child correctly on appearance only
(Christenfeld & Hill, 1995).
That young children nonetheless believe that parent and
child resemble each other suggests that their reasoning is not,
or at least not completely, appearance-bound. Indeed, there is
mounting evidence that sustains this conclusion (e.g., Gelman
& Markman, 1987; Keil, 1989). For instance, it has been
shown that children apply their beliefs about resemblance not
only to qualities that can be observed, but also to nonvisible
characteristics. Four- and 5-year-olds already argue that
children inherit not only their parent’s ‘‘big eyes’’ but also
their nonobservable ‘‘pink heart inside’’ (Springer & Keil,
1989).
Clearly, empirical evidence suggests that children endorse
the general rule that parents and children are somehow the
same. The question now becomes how they apply this general
rule of ‘‘sameness’’. Since sexual procreation involves more
than one parent, exact copies of one of the parents are hardly to
be expected. The combined genetic influence of both parents is
bound to create genetic variance in their offspring. The simple
notion that ‘‘like begets like’’ (Springer & Keil, 1989) provides
an adequate rule for the more general notion of family
resemblance (Johnson & Solomon, 1997; Springer, 1995,
1996, 1999; Springer & Keil, 1989). But in inheritance the
principle has to be adapted to the (complex) case of two
parents. Of course, we do not expect children to possess full
knowledge of Mendel’s laws. Rather, we would like to know
whether they have some naive understanding of the effects of a
combined genetic influence. If this is the case, we would expect
them to consider a descendant with the combined characte-
ristics of both parents to be a more likely genetic product than
an exact copy of one of the parents.
In previous research, it has already been argued that one
cannot conclude that young children really understand the
inheritance of properties simply from the fact that they expect a
resemblance between parent(s) and offspring. It has to be
established that they understand the autonomous character of
the underlying mechanism: the fact that resemblance is based
on nothing other than genetics (Carey & Spelke, 1994). The
procedure used most often to test children’s knowledge in this
respect is one in which children have to argue that properties
are inherited from a biological parent, but not from a close
friend of the family (Springer, 1992) or an adoptive parent
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(Solomon, Johnson, Zaitchik, & Carey, 1996; Springer, 1996).
Here we use a slightly different approach. In order to examine
children’s understanding of the combined genetic contribution
of both biological parents, our participants are confronted with
two biological parents with different physical characteristics. In
addition, a characteristic from a nongenetic domain is ascribed
to one parent but not the other. In the case of an additional
social variable, for instance, the subjects are told that one of the
parents has actively raised the child, whereas the other has left
immediately after birth. The subject is then asked to select the
most likely offspring out of three alternatives: a carbon copy of
the mother, a carbon copy of the father, or a third alternative
that shows a combination of parental characteristics (see
Figure 1). A choice for the third alternative is to be expected if
(1) children are able to refrain from a simple ‘‘like parent, like
child’’ rule (that would mandate them to choose the exact copy
of either the mother or the father) and favour an ‘‘imperfect
match’’ representing the combined influence of both parents,
and (2) if children acknowledge the influence of two biological
parents, irrespective of information from domains irrelevant to
the issue of inheritance (e.g., taking part in the child-rearing
process). However, if domain confusion takes place (i.e., if
children consider the additional information to be pertinent to
the issue of inherited resemblance), children are expected to
favour the parent who is credited with the additional char-
acteristic.
Previous experiments on domain confusion were limited to
a possible confounding with the social (e.g., social proximity)
and psychological (e.g., parental desires) domain (Carey,
1995; Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Inagaki, 1997; Keil,
1994; Piaget, 1929; Solomon et al., 1996; Springer, 1992,
1995, 1999; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Here, we also address
two other possible misconceptions that were first reported in
an interview study by Karbo, Hobbs, and Erickson (1980): the
genetic dominance of the mother and the overgeneralisation of
the gender factor. According to these authors, young children
seem to think that mothers contribute more to the genetic
make-up of the offspring than fathers (see also Clough &
Wood-Robinson, 1985; Springer, 1999). They suggest that
this bias is because of the mother’s more salient role in
procreation (see also Springer, 1996, 1999). However, physical
proximity (children come from ‘‘their mother’s tummy’’) may
not be the only reason. Social proximity (mothers are normally
the dominant caretaker) could be an alternative or additional
factor.
Karbo et al. (1980) have also demonstrated that some of
their respondents think of the same-sex parent as being the
most influential: sons resemble their fathers, whereas daugh-
ters resemble their mothers. Again, this simple rule may
originate from two distinct types of overgeneralisations. First, a
biological one, which concerns the overgeneralisation of
primary gender characteristics. Or, alternatively, a cultural or
social one, which refers to the overgeneralisation of social
conventions: males wear trousers, whereas females wear skirts;
males have short hair, whereas females have long hair.
In sum, this study aims to answer two related questions: (1)
To what extent do children of different ages (4-, 6-, and 10-
year-olds) have an intuitive understanding of inherited
resemblance as being the result of the combined influence of
both biological parents? and (2) To what extent do they
acknowledge the autonomous character of the domain of
heredity? Or, stated otherwise, to what extent are children’s
predictions about parental influence still governed by con-
siderations other than the biological relationship alone?
Method
Participants
One hundred and six children, recruited from day care centres
and schools in the city of Amsterdam, participated in the study.
Children came from three different age groups, each consisting
of 18 boys and 18 girls: 4- to 5-year-olds (M ¼ 5 yrs 2 mths;
SD ¼ 3.8 mths); 6- to 7-year-olds (M ¼ 6 yrs 9 mths; SD ¼ 3.5
mths) and 10- to 11-year-olds (M ¼ 10 yrs 9 mths; SD ¼ 3.6
mths).
The testing procedure started with the two oldest age
groups. As discussions in the international literature increas-
ingly focus on young children’s understanding of biological
phenomena, we decided to include an even younger age group
later on. At that time, we also decided that some control
questions (as will be explained in the Procedure section)
should be added to further improve the interpretation of the
results obtained. As it was not possible to approach the
previously tested children again, the responses to the control
questions for the two oldest age groups were gathered from two
equally assembled samples (18 males/18 females each) of
almost the same age (M ¼ 6 yrs 8 mths; SD ¼ 3.2 mths and
M ¼ 10 yrs 7 mths; SD ¼ 3.9 mths, respectively).
Materials and procedure
All children were interviewed individually in a separate, quiet
room at school. The first part of the interview consisted of four
pairs of questions and a single closing question, presented in a
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Figure 1. Example of the pictural material (pair I, question 1).
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fixed order. All questions asked for a selection of the most
likely descendant(s). The first eight questions (four pairs) were
accompanied by simple drawings of two biological parents
(well-known animals like cats and dogs) and three somewhat
smaller drawings representing their possible offspring (see
Figure 1).
In the first three pairs of questions, the parents were
different on two separate features (for example: ears and
whiskers in Figure 1). Only one of the parents was credited
with a characteristic from a different domain (as mentioned
below). Each pair consisted of an item in which that extra
information was attributed to the mother, and an item in which
exactly the same information was given about the father. Each
time the child had to select the most likely descendant out of
three alternatives: two identical versions of the parents (one
mother and one father look-alike) and a third alternative that
had one of the specific parental features in common with the
mother and the other with the father. First, both parents were
put next to each other in front of the children (left/right
position of father and mother were systematically alternated).
Then, the three answering alternatives were positioned in a
random way underneath. Whenever a picture was mentioned
explicitly in the instruction, the experimenter pointed to the
picture in question. The basic instruction was as follows:
Look, these two cats look different. This is the father-cat. He
has big black ear tips and short whiskers. And this is the mother-
cat. She has long whiskers and no black ear tips. Together they
have had a young kitten. What do you think the little kitten will
look like? Will it look like the father, as in this picture? Will it
look like the mother, as in this picture? Or will the little kitten
have something of both, as in this picture? What do you think?
Just point it out for me.
In pair I, we examined a possible bias based on social
proximity. Therefore the following information was added
before the children were asked for their prediction:
. . . Just after the kitten was born, the father-cat went away. The
young kitten and the mother always stayed together. What do
you think . . .
A parallel question was asked, which was completely identical
to the first one, except for the fact that this time the mother had
left and the child was raised by the father. So, in the case of a
socially biased answer, we would expect the child to point to
the look-alike of the mother in the first question, but to the
look-alike of the father in the second one. The two other pairs
were constructed in a similar way.
With the extra information presented in the second pair, we
examined the possible influence of a variable from the
psychological domain, i.e., a parental desire. The children were
instructed as follows:
. . . These horses very much wanted to have a young horse, a
foal, that would look like the mother, with a beautiful long neck
and a short tail. Then they really had a young horse of their own.
What do you think . . .
In the parallel question, the parents preferred a look-alike of
the father.
In the previous stories, no information was given about the
gender of the descendant. This kind of information was
introduced explicitly within the next pair of questions, in order
to examine a possible bias based on gender similarity.
. . . Together they had a young girl-bird. What do you think . . .
In the parallel question, the birth of a male descendant was
announced.
In the last pair of questions, the possible influence of gender
was examined in the same way. These questions had exactly
the same structure as the previous ones, except for one
difference: The parents were different only with respect to one
feature (for example, the mother dog had a black coat, whereas
the father-dog’s hair was white). Children were again pres-
ented with a look-a-like of the father, a look-alike of the
mother, and a third alternative in which the combined
influence of both parents was represented by a phenotypical
new feature. The question was asked in the following way:
. . . Will the young girl-dog be a white puppy, like her father?
Will she be black like her mother? Or will she be spotted black
and white, as in this picture? . . .
Again, in the parallel question, children were asked what a
male puppy would look like. Note that the exact wording of the
last pair of questions was different from the ones asked
previously, in that children were not explicitly told that you can
find ‘‘something of both’’ in the third alternative. Without a
naive kind of genetic theory about feature combinations,
‘‘spotted black and white’’ may be different from the phrase
that was used in the other questions: ‘‘something of both’’. So
this time, they had to make that translation for themselves.
In a final question, the matter of phenotypic variability,
introduced in the previous pair, was addressed in yet another
way. The children were presented with a picture of two large
dogs and eight smaller ones. They were told:
This father and mother dog look completely different. Look,
this is the father and this is the mother. Together they had a
number of young dogs; a litter of puppies. Underneath, you can
see a lot of little dogs. Some of them are children of this father
and mother and some of them have other fathers and mothers.
Can you point out for me the little dogs that belong to this
father and mother?
The two parental dogs, depicted at the top of the page, were
different on a number of aspects. Apart from their most salient
difference (one was completely black, while the other was
completely white), they possessed four further distinctive
elements (tail, ears, shape of the head, and coat texture).
The eight young dogs were depicted underneath, randomly
distributed over the page. Two of them were identical to a
parent, but only smaller. Two of them, one black and one
white dog, possessed a mixture of parental features (two
characterising elements from the father, combined with two
from the mother). The same was the case with the next two
young dogs. But this time the most salient feature, the parental
colour, was replaced by a phenotypical new feature that could
easily be imagined as originating from the combined influence
of both parents: one of them was coloured grey, whereas the
other was spotted black and white. The two remaining young
dogs also possessed phenotypical new features. But this time
they were irreducible to any of the parental characteristics (for
instance, one of these dogs had shorts paws, whereas both
parents had long ones).
In the youngest group, this initial set of questions was
immediately followed by two pairs of control questions allowing
us to strengthen the interpretation of the results obtained. As
explained in the Participants section, in the other two age
groups the responses to these questions were acquired from a
different but comparable sample.
The first pair of control questions was designed to elicit
responses from which we could further examine the issue of
domain confusion in young children. It is often suggested that
young children are not yet able to cope with the anomalies of
psychological testing. They do not anticipate ‘‘trick questions’’
and tend to assume that all information provided by an adult
experimenter has to be relevant for the situation at hand
(Donaldson, 1978). This testing artefact could facilitate
‘‘domain confusion’’, even when the child is in doubt about
whether the information at hand really has an effect on
heredity. In order to establish the magnitude of this tendency,
we added a couple of questions, in which the additional
information was completely irrelevant. After the basic instruc-
tion, we continued this irrelevant control question with:
. . . The father/mother dog has a lot of friends. All the other dogs
in the neighbourhood like to play with him/her. The mother/
father dog, on the other hand, is often lonely. . . .
and in the parallel question with:
. . . The mother/father horse is very strong and can run very fast.
The father/mother horse, on the other hand, is often tired. He/
she walks very slowly and has to rest several times on the way.
. . .
Note that popularity and strength have no connection to any
feasible childhood conception of heredity. Nonetheless both
can be easily used to establish the superiority of one parent
over the other. Since the two questions introduced two
different types of characteristics, it was necessary to check
whether they really could be considered as being parallel
questions. Therefore, half of the children within each group
were told about a socially superior father and a physically
superior mother, and for the other half it was the other way
around.
A second pair of control questions was asked since all the
questions previously asked allow for the possibility of two
different kinds of biases. In each pair of questions, a pair-
specific bias may occur (a social bias in pair I, a psychological
bias in pair II, a gender bias in pairs III and IV, and a
superiority bias in case of the first control question).
Alternatively, a mother bias may show up in all of the pairs
presented. To discriminate between the two, the questions
should be analysed in pairs. In the case of a pair-specific bias,
we would expect children to opt for the look-alike of the parent
who was credited with the extra characteristic. That is, in one
item they will opt for the mother look-alike and in the other for
the father look-alike. On the other hand, if they ascribe a
dominant influence to the mother, they will select the mother
look-alike on both items. However, we should not exclude
beforehand the possibility of children being vulnerable to either
kind of bias. With the present set-up, it might be that a bias
based on the extra information has masked the mother bias. In
order to assess the prevalence of the mother bias more
accurately, we therefore presented children with an additional
pair of questions, in which we gave them the basic standard
control instruction, as phrased at the beginning of this section,
without any further information. Of course, a single question
would have sufficed here. However, since all the other
questions had to be analysed in pairs (see the results section),
we asked the same question twice with respect to different
pictorial materials.
Results
The analysis presented is based on the combined answers on
the two parallel questions within each question pair. (In the
case of the irrelevant information, we first checked whether
both questions produced the same results, as different types of
information were used here. This indeed proved to be the case,
so that this content variable was ignored in further analyses).
With three answering alternatives for each question, this results
in (3  3 ¼) 9 possible answering patterns. So, with 36 subjects
within each age group, a uniform distribution would result in
(36 ‚ 9) 4 observations per cell. In Table 1, the observed
frequencies of three of these patterns are presented for each
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DEVELOPMENT, 2003, 27 (4), 366–374 369
Table 1
Frequenciesa of criterium-consistent answer patterns within each of
the question pairs, by age
Question-pair




Gender bias 10 8
Superiority bias 8
Mother bias 5 7 6 7 6 11
Combined parental influence 6 8 7 10 9 14




Gender bias 9 6
Superiority bias 4
Mother bias 6 8 7 9 7 10
Combined parental influence 15 13 16 11 14 17




Gender bias 2 3
Superiority bias 0
Mother bias 0 0 0 0 1 5
Combined parental influence 30 24 25 22 32 30
S inconsistent patterns 6 11 9 11 3 1
a In all cases, the observed number of inconsistent patterns is
significantly lower than the expected number under the assumption of
a uniform distribution. Within all other patterns, an observed
frequency 4 7 is significantly higher and an observed frequency < 1
is significantly lower than the expected frequency (4) within a uniform
distribution.
b First four patterns are pair-specific.
c Control questions: Irr ¼ superiority information added, irrelevant
to any feasible ‘‘heredity theory’’; St ¼ basic standard question,
without additive information. (In the case of the two oldest groups,
these results originated from a new sample—see Method.)
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pair of questions. The first pattern represents a pair-specific
answering bias: a consistent choice in favour of the descendant
identical to the parent who raised the child (social bias; pair I),
the parent with the favoured looks (psychological bias; pair II),
the parent of the same gender (gender similarity bias; pairs III
and IV), or the parent who shows superiority in a completely
irrelevant area (superiority bias; irrelevant control pair). More
specifically, these observed frequencies indicate a choice of
either the father or the mother look-alike within each pair,
dependent on which parent was credited with the extra
characteristic. (Since no extra information was given in the
standard control pair, such a meaningful pattern is absent in
this condition). The second pattern of results indicates a
general mother bias: a consistent choice in favour of the
mother look-alike. And the third pattern represents a
consistent choice in favour of the alternative in which the
features of both parents are combined. The latter two patterns
may be observed among all pairs, including the standard
control condition. The remaining possible answering patterns
(six for the first four pairs of questions and seven in the case of
the standard control condition) are taken together and labelled
as inconsistent patterns, meaning that they are not consistent
with any of the feasible childhood conceptions of heredity
described earlier. None of these so-called inconsistent patterns
appeared with a frequency significantly higher than expected
under the assumption of a uniform distribution.
Each pair of questions was analysed by a separate log-linear
procedure (age by answering pattern), in order to test whether
the observed distribution was different from the uniform
distribution. This was clearly the case for all pairs: w2(6, 108) ¼
52.99 (pair I); w2(6, 108) ¼ 28.87 (pair II), w2(6, 108) ¼ 33.04
(pair III); w2(6, 108) ¼ 21.50 (pair IV); w2(6, 108) ¼ 33.66
(irrelevant control pair) and w2(4, 108) ¼ 19.98 (standard
control pair). In all cases, p < .001. In conformation of our
expectations, an inspection of Table 1 shows that the number
of choices in favour of the alternative representing a combined
parental influence (combined parental influence pattern)
increases with age. Even the youngest age group seems to
have at least some notion of this general rule of inheritance,
as this pattern of results is obtained with almost 40% of the
4/5-year-olds in the standard control condition. However, with
respect to the two younger groups, a consistent choice for a
combined influence becomes less frequent in response to the
other questions. This suggests that their conception of
inherited resemblance is still relatively easily affected by
information from other domains. Indeed, all of the biases
under investigation show up in the answers of both groups. In
the case of the youngest age group, even information that can
be considered completely irrelevant to the issue of inheritance
produces a bias. In the group of 6-year-old children, the
superiority bias no longer appears above chance level, but all
the other biases are still present. In contrast, the 10- and 11-
year-olds clearly acknowledge the irrelevancy of both the
superiority information and all the other types of additional
information. At this age, any bias caused by information from
domains irrelevant to the issue of inherited resemblance is
completely absent in most cases. Only incidentally, the mother
bias shows up in the standard control condition. We will return
to this anomaly in the Discussion.
Age differences regarding the different answering patterns
were underpinned by an analysis of contrasts (age 4/5 vs. 6/7,
age 6/7 vs. 10/11, and age 4/5 vs. 10/11; p < .05, 2-tailed). The
results show that children’s choice of the alternative reflecting
the combined genetic contribution of both parents increases
with age. The differences between the two youngest groups
only reach significance within pairs I and III, but between the
ages of 6 and 10, a marked change is observed on all the pairs.
As expected, the combined parental influence pattern
proved to be the only pattern that increases with age. The
pair-specific patterns that might indicate the use of an
alternative theory are no longer present in the oldest age
group. Most changes here seem to occur between the age of 6
and 10. With respect to the social bias (pair I), the psycho-
logical bias (pair II), and the gender bias (pair III), the choices
of the oldest age group differ significantly from those of the two
youngest age groups. No significant differences are found
between children aged 4/5 and children aged 6/7. In pair IV,
the pair in which offspring with a new phenotypical feature was
introduced, age differences, although consistent with the
results found with pair III, were less outspoken. Finally, the
frequency with which the superiority pattern was found
(irrelevant Control pair) differed only significantly between
the age of 4/5 and the age of 10/11 (with children aged 6
halfway between).
Unlike the different types of pair-specific biases, the child’s
acknowledgement of the combined influence of both parents
may become evident in all question pairs. This allows for a
check on intra-individual consistency. Since the data on the
two control pairs were partly collected from different children,
we have to limit ourselves to consistency on the four
experimental pairs. Complete consistency over those four
question pairs was found only for 12 children from the oldest
group. But if we use the more lenient criterion of 3 out of 4,
our standard of consistency was met by 4 of the 4/5-year-olds,
8 of the 6/7-year-olds, and no fewer than 19 of the 10/11-year-
olds. So, even the answers of some of the youngest children
seem to reflect a theory-like notion of combined parental
influence.
The second answering pattern that may appear on all pairs
is the general mother bias. If we exclude the standard control
question for a moment, this bias shows roughly the same
change with age as the other biases: a significant decrease after
the age of 6, so that no bias is found at age 10. The difference
between children aged 4/5 and children aged 10/11 just missed
significance in the case of pair I and the irrelevant control pair.
Nonetheless, within the context of all the other comparisons,
the general conclusion that the answers of both of the younger
age groups still show a mother bias seems to be justified. As has
been argued in the Procedure, children’s answers to the
questions asked in the standard control condition may reflect a
convincing general mother bias. Interestingly, no significant
age differences are found on this question pair. Unlike the
other biases, then, the mother bias proves to be quite
persistent.
If the mother bias is based on a more or less stable theory of
heredity, we would expect children who adhere to this theory
to use it consistently in their decisions. However, none of the
children showed the mother bias in all four experimental pairs,
and no more than one (6-year-old) child met the more lenient
criterion of 3 out of 4. So, if we want to hold on to the idea that
some children use the principle of mother dominance as a
general guideline, we have to conclude that its influence is
often outweighed by other phenomena. Contrary to the
principle of combined parental influence, the dominant
position ascribed to the mother seems to reflect a bias more
than a theory.
The next issue we would like to address concerns children’s
acceptance of new phenotypes. Some of the findings discussed
previously are of relevance here. Remember that children’s
answers to question pair IV show roughly the same pattern of
results as their answers to question pair III, even though (for
reasons explained in the Method) in the former case the third
alternative was not explicitly introduced as one reflecting the
combined influence of both parents. Apparently, new pheno-
types are relatively easily accepted, even by young children.
We now turn to the results obtained with the single closing
question, in which the issue of genetic variability and the
acceptance of new features was explicitly addressed. Remem-
ber that the respondents could select a maximum of two dogs
within each appearance category. A 3  4 MANOVA (Age 
Appearance) procedure, with repeated measures on the last
variable, showed a main effect of Age, F(2, 105) ¼ 9.59, p <
.001. That is, the number of dogs selected diminishes with age
(means: 5.37, 4.50, and 3.60, respectively, out of a maximum
of 8). Next to this, a main effect of Appearance was found, F(3,
315) ¼ 41.36, p < .001; the means are 1.68, 1.15, 1.03, 0.64
for the identical dogs, the dogs with mixtures of parental
characteristics, the dogs with new retraceable features, and the
dogs with new irreducible features, respectively. Moreover, a
marginally significant interaction of Age  Appearance (p ¼
.10) showed that age differences were not identical for each of
the appearance categories. Separate ANOVAs on children’s
choices for each of the four types of appearances showed only a
significant effect of Age in the case of the dogs with new
irreducible features, F(2, 105) ¼ 8.83, p < .001. The two
youngest age groups chose dogs from this appearance category
significantly more often than the oldest age group (means:
0.94, 0.72, and 0.25, respectively; ps < .05). In sum, these
results suggest that children from all age groups easily accept
new phenotypes. However, both 4- and 6-year-old children’s
answers did not show the same limitations to the concept of
genetic variability as those of 10-year-olds, as they also
relatively frequently selected dogs with new features that
cannot be reduced to parental characteristics. Ten-year-olds
rarely chose these far-fetched alternatives.
Discussion
The results clearly indicate that a conception of heredity in
which the combined influence of both parents is acknowledged
grows with age. Although even some of the youngest children
more or less consistently prefer a descendant in which
characteristics of both parents are united and thus seem to
have developed a theory-like conception in this sense, it is not
until the age of 10 that most participants consistently react in
this way. Moreover, it has been shown that it is only in this
older age group that information from other domains is clearly
considered irrelevant. In contrast, younger children (6/7-year-
olds and 4/5-year-olds alike) still seem to be susceptible to
domain confusion to some extent (e.g., Carey, 1985; Piaget,
1929), as they erroneously use information from other domains
to decide on the superiority of one parent over the other.
To be credited with a domain-specific (i.e., biological)
theory of heredity, children need to understand that it is the
biological relationship that is critical for the inheritance of
properties. The age differences found in the present study are
consistent with the developmental findings of Solomon et al.
(1996), in the sense that children aged 7 or younger still tend
to explain the inheritance of physical properties by social
proximity and psychological considerations; variables that are
irrelevant to a biological theory of heredity. Moreover, the
other types of information included in this study (gender
similarity, and the identity of the mother) did produce a similar
effect.
In our opinion, it is not very useful to directly compare the
different types of domain confusions at hand. One reason for
our reluctance in this respect has already been addressed: The
same piece of information may refer to different domains. The
effect of gender (dis)similarity, for instance, can be explained
along biological as well as social or cultural lines. Likewise, a
general mother-bias may originate from biological proximity
(‘‘children come from their mothers’ tummies’’), but social
considerations may exert an effect as well (‘‘Mothers and their
children are much more often together’’). Explanations
referring to different domains are almost impossible to disen-
tangle. Next, the results show that the different types of
information presented equally often cause confusion (see
Table 1). In each case, roughly one out of four children chose
a look-alike of the parent credited with the extra characteristic.
This seems to suggest a general vulnerability in children’s
theorising rather than their being susceptible to specific domain
confusions.
Before we address the nature of this vulnerability any
further, we first have to present the various positions in the
literature on the acquisition of a framework theory of biology.
Springer (1995, 1999) distinguishes two types of proposals.
Type 1 links the emergence primarily to innate predispositions
(e.g., Keil, 1989, 1994; Wellman & Gelman, 1992), whereas
Type 2 assumes that a naive theory of biology is derived from
other framework theories (e.g., Carey, 1985). The latter type
implies that naive biology emerges through a variety of
processes, including the acquisition and reorganisation of
biological knowledge. However, as Springer (1999) points out,
the differences are merely a matter of emphasis: Type 1
theorists do not deny the importance of experience and Type 2
theorists acknowledge the possibility of genetic constraints on
theory acquisition. Springer suggests a third type of theoretical
stance (a combination of both): The child’s acknowledgement
that babies grow inside the mother marks the beginning of a
naive theory of biology. This knowledge allows children to
make theoretically based (though sometimes incorrect) predic-
tions about the phenotype and (equally often incorrect, but
internally consistent) notions about inheritance. In short,
‘‘learning about an unseen process changes children’s under-
standing of observable features’’ (Springer, 1999, p. 47).
With Springer’s type of reasoning in mind, we questioned
our youngest participants at the end of each session about the
role of the mother in procreation. Somewhat unexpectedly
(Goldman & Goldman, 1982), we found that all children, but
for one exception, proved to be clearly aware that children
‘‘come from their mothers’ tummies’’. Maybe Dutch children
are advanced in this sense, or general knowledge has improved
over the last 20 years. Anyway, this outcome made it
impossible to use this question as a way to check Springer’s
claim about the critical importance of this kind of knowledge.
Nonetheless, with this precondition fulfilled, the results seem
to fit Springer’s developmental ideas. The consistency of the
answer patterns increases with age, suggesting an increasing
amount of theory-based reasoning. Initially, most of these
theories are still incorrect. Type 1 theorists may like to point
out that a significant proportion of even the youngest group
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DEVELOPMENT, 2003, 27 (4), 366–374 371
372 MEERUM TERWOGT ET AL. / CHILDREN’S UNDERSTANDING OF INHERITANCE
seems to have an intuitive understanding of a combined
parental genetic influence. Type 2 theorists, on the other hand,
will probably stress the fact that their answer pattern is still
often disturbed by nongenetic considerations. Springer’s
explanation would have been that their experience-based
knowledge may still have guided these children in the wrong
direction: people often succeed in making their wishes come
true; the rearing process does increase the number of shared
characteristics between parent and child; and gender similarity
does imply a number of shared gender characteristics. Later
on, when their genetic reasoning becomes more integrated and
coherent, they become able to question the relevancy of this
local knowledge.
Before we ask ourselves the question of how genetic
reasoning changes over time, we have to point out the
possibility that, even without the theoretical notion of a
combined genetic influence of both parents, the experience-
based knowledge of young children might have pushed them in
the direction of the correct answer alternative. Later on, we will
discuss the fact that the notion of genetic variability seems to
be acknowledged quite early in life. In itself, this notion could
have been sufficient to reject the two carbon copies as possible
alternatives. Indeed, in everyday life, it is extremely unlikely
that a child perfectly resembles one of the parents. In an
unpublished study by Springer (reported in Springer, 1999), it
was found that children acknowledge this fact: They expressed
the opinion that the baby will never look exactly like either
parent in shape, colour, and probably most importantly, size.
Our three offspring alternatives were all smaller in size but,
strictly speaking, it is still possible to argue that a choice in
favour of the third alternative merely reflects a rejection of the
other two on the basis of genetic variability. However, the
closing question that specifically addresses the variability topic
reveals no age differences in the acceptance of both carbon
copies and offspring with mixed features. Therefore, the
increasing preference for the latter alternative cannot be
sufficiently explained by a growing acceptation of new
phenotypes and/or a rejection of the possibility that children
exactly resemble a parent. It has to be attributed to an
improvement of genetic reasoning.
As was pointed out at the start, the first important step in
genetic reasoning is the application of the ‘‘like-begets-like’’
principle. Although children already tend to use this principle
relatively early in life (Springer & Keil, 1989), it is quite likely
that they apply this rule in a rigid way. This might cause them
to prefer a carbon copy of one of the parents over the no more
than partial resemblance resulting from the combined influ-
ence of both. They still, however, have to make a choice
between the two carbon copies. This makes it tempting to use
the additional information, as long as they still think it possible
that this information is relevant. This two-step decision-
making process exactly fits the findings in the two youngest
groups, although only the 4-year-olds still use the kind of
information that does not fit into any feasible theoretical
conception of heredity. This is consistent with Donaldson’s
(1978) suggestion that the testing procedure per se might have
been confusing for them. They might have automatically
concluded that the experimenter expected them to use all
information provided.
A choice in favour of the third option could be strengthened
in a positive way: by the conception that both parents have an
impact on their descendants; and a negative one: by the
dismissal of the additive information as theoretically unsound.
Both considerations are directly related to the strength of
children’s theorising about the inheritance of properties, but
strictly speaking the present set-up does not allow for a
conclusion about the strength of the former factor. However,
the results are quite clear about the latter one. Whereas 4-year-
olds used any information to decide for the superiority of one
parent over the other, 6-year-olds’ answers were no longer
influenced by the information presented in the ‘‘irrelevant’’
condition. Only the 10-year-olds, however, were able to resist
all information from other domains.
An interesting finding concerns children’s preference for a
carbon copy of the mother. In the Results, we have shown that
although a choice for a carbon copy of the mother occurs
consistently within pairs (the prevalence of the answering
pattern referred to as the ‘‘mother bias’’), no such consistency
was found over pairs. Rather than a dominant early theory of
heredity (Springer, 1995, 1999), the mother bias, just like all
other biases, seems to reflect a general vulnerability of genetic
reasoning during this early stage. Just like the other biases, the
mother bias has disappeared at age 10, but for one exception:
Its influence is still noticeable on the answers to the standard
control question—the only question that lacks additional
information. The acknowledgement that this type of informa-
tion is irrelevant may have triggered a new formal rule, which
caused the participants to be extra careful not to use anything
other than the newly acquired genetic principle that both
parents exert an equal genetic influence. So it seems that,
without this kind of prime, children are still tempted to base
their answers on implicit notions about the relative importance
of the mother.
Our results regarding the mother bias, was shown which
under certain conditions, even among 10-year-olds, corrobo-
rates earlier findings (Clough & Wood-Robinson, 1985; Karbo
et al., 1980) and suggests that, in this case, we are dealing with
a persistent phenomenon. Within this context, it might be
illustrative to mention the outcome of a post hoc survey, which
suggests that mother dominance persists long after the age of
10. We presented the standard control question to a number of
students. As we expected, all of them selected the third
alternative (combined features) as the most likely offspring.
Nonetheless—although we may take it that their formal
education has taught them differently—a few of them added
spontaneously that children normally have a somewhat
stronger resemblance to their mother. The exact reason for
this idea remains obscure. It might be a reflection of the central
position ascribed to the mother in anything related to children,
which then causes over-generalisation of the notion of dom-
inance of the mother over the father. But it could also be that
we simply have to regard the phenomenon as an unconscious
remnant of our earliest childhood theory of inheritance.
Whatever the reason for such a nonrational choice, the
observation in itself suggests that domain confusions or
theoretical inconsistencies probably never disappear comple-
tely.
Just as the choice of the third alternative does not exclude all
biases, when it is governed by the idea that the offspring has to
show at least some characteristics of each parent, the choice of
a carbon copy does not automatically imply that the child has
no notion of genetic variability. The participants had only three
options, which may not have fitted their ideas completely. The
closing question was less limited in options. Indeed, even on
this question, young children show a relative preference for a
perfect look-alike. But they clearly do not reject the idea of
genetic variability altogether and select a substantial number of
dogs other than the perfect carbon copies. Obviously, they are
not completely ruled by the principle that ‘‘like begets like’’ or
they would have rejected the whole concept of genetic
variability. Instead, we see that the phenomenon as such is
accepted relatively early in life. It is quite easy to observe that
children never completely resemble a parent. So the basic idea
of genetic variability is probably derived from personal
experience. However, it is doubtful whether young children
really understand the underlying principles. Contrary to 10-
year-olds, both 4- and 6-year-olds quite often selected dogs
with new irreducible features, which suggests a poor
understanding of the limitations of phenotypic variance.
The general principles of heredity are almost impossible to
learn by observation alone. Physical similarities between
parents and children, for instance, are much harder to observe
than is often taken for granted (Christenfeld & Hill, 1995).
Verbal communication is probably an influential factor in
constructing a theory of heredity (Inagaki, 1990). The children
themselves are the eliciting stimuli for conversations on this
topic. Sociobiology teaches that the survival of genetic material
is one of the main motives behind the behaviour of all species.
This makes it understandable that parents are eager to detect
concrete evidence for the survival of their genes (Meerum
Terwogt, Hoeksma, & Koops, 1993). Even before they have
left the cradle, young children are exposed to numerous
messages that contain relevant information about this biologi-
cal phenomenon. Again and again, they have listened to
statements like ‘‘Look, he has his father’s nose’’, or ‘‘She is the
perfect image of her mother’’. When we bear this in mind, it is
not surprising that the general idea that children have
something in common with their parents develops quite early
in life. We do not need to assume some kind of inborn
understanding of heredity for this. The ‘‘like begets like’’
principle is the most simple and direct translation of this
resemblance conception.
The present experiment has shown that a substantial
number of the 4- and 6-year-old children still fail to adapt
this rule to a two-fold situation. The ‘‘like begets like’’
principle may have put them on the wrong track and made it
difficult for them to ignore a perfect resemblance to one parent,
in favour of a no more than partial resemblance to both
parents. As we pointed out, this phenomenon cannot be taken
as hard evidence that these children fail to understand
completely that both parents contribute to the physical
appearance of their children. In fact, a somewhat different
testing procedure, like the one that was used in the closing
question, suggests otherwise. Nonetheless, even when we
realise that the experiment is a rather severe test of children’s
knowledge, since it is effectively designed as a kind of counter-
suggestion procedure, it is legitimate to conclude that 4- and 6-
year-old children are still easily confused by the presence of
information that would be considered irrelevant only in the
case of a firm, well-defined conception of heredity.
The age differences observed in this experiment do not give
grounds for a radical view of restructuring (Kuhn, 1962) in the
area of heredity. In that case, we would have expected a
developmental shift: A more or less fixed transition period in
which the child changes core concepts and consequently moves
on from one knowledge system to another. The data rather
suggest a progressive incorporation of knowledge elements and
a gradual growth to a more restricted and a better defined
conception of the principles of heredity. However, the
possibility of developmental shifts cannot be excluded com-
pletely for at least two reasons. First, we have not studied the
individual pathways of development. If the accumulation of
individual experience is the main reason for these conceptual
shifts, as Springer (1999) suggests, we cannot expect them to
take place at a fixed moment in life. Individual transitions
might have been masked by the fact that we are comparing age
groups. Second, the strongest development clearly takes place
between age 6 and 10; an age gap that is still quite large. Future
research should focus more on the years in between in order to
determine what exactly happens during that period.
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